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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
What is a “meritorious” securities fraud class action?  The only clear answer to this 
question is one that produces a judgment after trial.  Trials, however, are virtually unheard of in 
this area; cases that are not dismissed are settled.  A broader answer to the question is a case that 
produces a settlement instead of being dismissed.  That answer is little better than the first, 
however, because defendants, anxious to avoid the distraction of litigation, high defense attorney 
fees, negative publicity surrounding a securities lawsuit, and the specter of potentially 
bankrupting damages, may be willing to pay a “nuisance” settlement to make the case go away, 
even when they perceive the plaintiffs likelihood of succeeding at trial as rather low (Pritchard 
1999).  As a policy matter, if we could screen out suits filed for their nuisance value, while 
leaving unobstructed suits with substantial evidence of merit, the litigation process would be 
unambiguously improved.  Unfortunately, the difficulty of assessing merit without a judgment 
makes it impossible to measure precisely the proportion of nuisance settlements to settlements 
based on the strength of the claims. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in assessing merit in securities fraud class 
actions, Congress accepted the argument that plaintiffs’ attorneys were filing large numbers of 
claims without substantial evidence of fraud in an effort to “extort” nuisance settlements from 
defendants.  To discourage such “frivolous” litigation, Congress enacted the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) in 1995.  The PSRLA includes a number of procedural 
provisions intended to screen out weaker claims early in the litigation process and thereby reduce 
the costs of defending non-meritorious litigation.  The goal of the legislation is to make 
settlement negotiations turn more on the strength of the evidence of fraud and less on the defense 
costs to be avoided by settlement.  These procedural barriers have resulted in a higher percentage 
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of securities fraud class actions being dismissed (Foster et al., 2000).  The number of suits being 
filed, however, has not declined.  After an initial dip, the number of securities fraud class actions 
has returned to, and even exceeded in some years, its pre-PSLRA level. (Foster et al., 2005).  
The larger number of filings suggests that the PSLRA may have done little to discourage the 
filing of frivolous suits, although it may have increased their likelihood of dismissal.   
A contrary view, however, is that the incidence of fraud may have increased even faster 
than the increase in class action filings.  All else equal, the procedural barriers of the PSLRA 
likely raised the cost to plaintiffs’ attorneys to pursue a class action and reduced the expected 
outcome from litigation.  If this view is correct, the barriers erected by the PSLRA may be 
discouraging not only frivolous litigation, but also litigation that would have been deemed 
meritorious under the pre-PSLRA standards.   
Our study is the first to measure the magnitude of this screening effect.  We collect two 
samples of securities class actions involving allegations of secondary market fraud – one from 
1991 to 1995 (pre-PSLRA), and one from 1996-2000 (post-PSLRA).  Each sued firm is matched 
with a firm from the same industry and time period that was not sued.  The matching procedure 
allows us to construct a litigation prediction model for each period based on the firms’ 
characteristics, including market capitalization, share turnover, minimum stock price drop, 
accounting restatements, insider trading, earnings forecasts, and a variety of governance factors.  
We apply our post-PSLRA litigation prediction model to the pre-PSLRA sample.  By 
comparing the model’s predictions with the actual incidence of suit, we can identify which firms 
would have been sued (or not sued) had the PSLRA’s provisions been in effect during the 1991 
to 1995 period.  The firms that the PSLRA model predicts should not have been sued but in fact 
were sued and paid a non-nuisance settlement in the pre-PSLRA period provide a measure of the 
2  
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screening effect of the PSLRA.  Our screening analysis allows us to provide evidence on the 
proportion of firms that proved a profitable target for a securities class action in the pre-PSLRA 
period but not so in the post-PSLRA period.   
The screening may not all occur at the time the decision to file is made; additional 
screening may be done during the litigation process.  Accordingly, we conduct a similar analysis 
using a settlements model, allowing us to identify firms that paid a settlement greater than 
nuisance value in the pre-PSLRA period, but likely would not have done so had the PSLRA been 
in effect at the time. 
Taken together, our results suggest that the PSLRA has had a screening effect; a 
substantial percentage of suits that would have resulted in a non-nuisance settlement prior to the 
PSLRA would not have been filed after Congress adopted the PSLRA, and even if filed, would 
be less likely to produce a non-nuisance settlement.  The screening effect is not observable, 
however, if we consider cases with “hard evidence” of securities fraud – a restatement of 
earnings or revenues or an investigation by the SEC – or abnormal insider trading.   
We also find evidence of a different sort of screening effect that Congress would 
presumably favor – a nuisance suit effect.  Applying the post-PSLRA filing model to lawsuits 
that settled for nuisance value pre-PSLRA, we find that significantly fewer of these suits would 
have been filed post-PSLRA.  Finally, there is evidence of a significant nuisance suit effect for 
suits based on earnings warnings.  These results suggest fewer unwarranted suits against 
companies. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II provides institutional background on the 
PSLRA and discusses related research.  Section III develops our hypotheses.  Section IV 
3  
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describes the sample selection procedure and data collected.  Section V presents our results.  
Section VI concludes the paper with a summary and discussion of our major findings. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
After extensive hearings, Congress concluded in 1995 that the potentially enormous 
damages in securities fraud class actions were encouraging frivolous “strike” suits.  (H.R. Rep., 
1995; S. Rep., 1995).  To check these perceived abuses, Congress enacted the PSLRA into law 
on December 22, 1995.  The PSLRA contains a number of new hurdles for plaintiffs filing 
securities fraud complaints.  Perhaps most daunting of these hurdles is the PSLRA’s safe harbor 
for the voluntary disclosure of financial projections and other forward-looking information.1  To 
qualify for safe harbor protection, the statements must be identified as forward-looking and be 
accompanied by “meaningful” cautionary language discussing important factors that could cause 
actual results to differ from those projected.  In the absence of an appropriate disclaimer, the 
plaintiff must still prove that the statements were made with actual knowledge that they were 
false or misleading. 
 A more pervasive barrier to weak claims is the PSLRA’s stringent pleading standard, 
which makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to allege securities fraud without specific evidence of 
misconduct.2  Plaintiffs must specify in their complaint each statement alleged to have been 
misleading and the reasons why the statement is misleading.  In addition, plaintiffs must state 
with particularity facts giving rise to a “strong inference” that the defendant acted with “the 
required state of mind,” i.e., with fraudulent intent.    
                                                 
1 See Section 21E, Exchange Act. 
2 Section 21D(b)(2), Exchange Act. 
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 Both the forward-looking safe harbor and the pleading standard are reinforced by the 
PSLRA’s discovery stay, preventing plaintiffs from conducting discovery while a motion to 
dismiss is pending.3  This provision is intended to prevent plaintiffs from engaging in a “fishing 
expedition” for evidence to build their case, which, it is frequently argued, causes defendants to 
settle dubious claims simply to avoid the high cost of discovery.  Without discovery until after 
the motion to dismiss has been decided, however, plaintiffs’ attorneys face a higher cost in 
determining the presence of specific misleading statements and omissions and the materiality of 
such misstatements and omissions.  Moreover, plaintiffs face a difficult time in gathering facts 
related to the state of mind of the defendants, which the PSLRA’s pleading standard makes a 
critical question in resolving the motion to dismiss. 
In addition, the PSLRA requires courts to review a securities fraud class action after the 
“final adjudication” and impose sanctions (including the defendants’ attorney’s fees) if the court 
determines that the lawsuit was frivolous.4  For those suits that lead to a settlement, courts must 
review attorneys’ fees to ensure that they are “reasonable,” potentially reducing the expected 
return to plaintiffs’ attorneys for any given settlement or judgment amount.5  Greater court 
scrutiny of both the merits of the complaint as well as the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees 
lowers the expected return to plaintiffs’ attorneys from bringing a class action.  Finally, the 
PSLRA imposes proportionate liability on defendants of a Rule 10b-5 action, relieving less 
culpable parties (such as auditors and outside directors) of a portion of the total liability.6  This 
may reduce the funds available for settlement, thus also reducing potential returns from filing 
suit. 
                                                 
3 See Section 21D(b)(3)(B), Exchange Act. 
4 See Section 21D(c), Exchange Act. 
5 See Section 21D(a)(6), Exchange Act. 
6 Section 21D(f), Exchange Act.   
5  
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Related Literature 
 The earliest work in this area focuses on the market’s reaction to the PSLRA.  Spiess and 
Tkac (1997) and Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson (2000) document that, on average, the PSLRA 
was wealth-increasing for stockholders.  Specifically, there was a significant negative market 
reaction to news releases indicating that President Clinton would veto the legislation, followed 
by a significant positive reaction to the veto override.7  Moreover, the market response is 
increasing in firms’ overall risk of litigation, but decreasing in the incremental probability of 
being sued for fraud (Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson 2000).  Also consistent with this evidence, 
Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard (2000) find an overall positive market reaction to a related event, 
a Ninth Circuit court decision adopting a particularly stringent interpretation of the PSLRA’s 
pleading standard.  The reaction is particularly strong for firms headquartered in the Ninth 
Circuit and those at greatest risk of being sued in a securities class action.  Taken together, this 
evidence suggests that shareholders viewed the PSLRA’s restrictions on securities litigation to be 
beneficial.     
Other studies focus more directly on the effect of the PSLRA on litigation.  Studies 
describing the frequency of lawsuit filings and the type of allegations show that lawsuit filings 
initially declined under the PSLRA, but subsequently recovered to pre-PSLRA levels (Grundfest 
and Perino 1997; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000; Perino 2003).8  In addition, allegations of 
accounting irregularities and insider trading increased, while cases based on allegations of false 
forecasts decreased.     
                                                 
7 Ali and Kallapur (2001), however, argue that the positive abnormal return at the time of the PSLRA’s enactment is 
more likely a response to the presidential veto rather than the override, and thus shareholders considered the PSLRA 
to be harmful. 
8 Most of the decline appears to be due to plaintiffs shifting venue to state courts to avoid the PSLRA.  However, the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act was passed on November 3, 1998, effectively closing this loophole. 
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Pritchard and Sale (2005) study how judges in the Second and Ninth Circuit apply the 
PSLRA to resolve motions to dismiss securities fraud complaints.  They find that complaints are 
significantly more likely to be dismissed in the Ninth Circuit.  They also find that allegations of 
insider trading in complaints correlate with dismissal in both circuits, but that the circuits vary in 
their approaches to allegations of accounting violations and false-forward looking statements.  
Their study is limited, however, to the allegations made in the complaints and they do not 
compare the pre-and post-PSLRA periods.  Beatty, Drake and Hogan (2001) find that the risk of 
litigation in connection with an IPO declined significantly following the enactment of the 
PSLRA, but they do not provide evidence on the determinants of those filings.  Finally, Bajaj, 
Mazumdar and Sarin (2003) find that although mean settlements increased after the passage of 
the PSLRA, investors recovered a smaller percentage of potential losses.  They do not, however, 
compare systematically whether the determinants of those settlements have changed with the 
adoption of the PSLRA. 
Two prior studies relate most directly to this one.  Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard (JNP) 
(2007) analyze whether merit-related factors matter more in the post-PSLRA period.  They find 
that certain indicia of fraud, such as accounting restatements, are more significant in explaining 
the incidence and outcome of suits filed after the PSLRA relative to suits filed before the Act.  
They also find that forward-looking statements are less significant in explaining the incidence 
and outcome of suits post-PSLRA.9  That paper, however, does not address the related question 
of whether the PSRLA has screened out claims that would have been deemed meritorious under 
pre-PSLRA standards.  Choi (2007) examines this question in connection with firms making 
                                                 
9 Johnson et al. (2001) examine whether firms changed their disclosure policies in response to the safe harbor.  They 
find a significant increase in the frequency of firms issuing forecasts and the number of forecasts issued in the first 
year following enactment of the PSLRA, and that the change in disclosure is increasing in firms’ ex ante risk of 
litigation.  Although this evidence suggests that managers believe the safe harbor reduced legal exposure, Johnson et 
al. (2001) do not examine the relation between disclosure and litigation in the post-PSLRA period. 
7  
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initial public offerings.  He finds that companies engaged in smaller offerings or with a lower 
secondary market volume (and therefore reduced potential damage awards) are significantly less 
likely to find themselves the target of a securities class action in the post-PSLRA period.  He also 
provides evidence that the pre-PSLRA non-nuisance claims lacking obvious hard evidence 
indicia of fraud (an accounting restatement or SEC action) would have faced a lower probability 
of suit and a greater likelihood of receiving a dismissal or low-value settlement in the post-
PSLRA period. He posits that the PSLRA caused plaintiffs’ attorneys to shift their attention to 
the subset of fraud cases where the presence of hard evidence made it easier for such attorneys to 
meet enhanced pleading requirements under the PSLRA absent discovery.     
Choi (2007) limits his study, however, to lawsuits arising out of initial public offerings. 
The primary liability exposure for IPO firms is under the main Securities Act antifraud 
provision, § 11.  Only part of the PSLRA applies to Securities Act claims.  Although plaintiffs 
must show the presence of a materially misleading statement or omission, § 11 does not require 
that plaintiffs plead scienter on the part of defendants.  Thus, the central provision of the 
PSLRA’s pleading standard does not apply to Securities Act claims.  Moreover, the safe harbor 
for forward-looking statements does not shelter statements made by IPO firms.  Therefore, a 
comprehensive evaluation of the screening effect of the PSLRA requires the study of open-
market fraud claims litigated under Rule 10b-5, were Congress’s principal focus in enacting the 
PSLRA.  These claims are also considerably more common that § 11 claims. 
8  
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III. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Nuisance Claims 
 It is widely agreed that the PSLRA has made it more difficult to file a securities fraud 
complaint that can withstand a motion to dismiss.  Given the higher bar erected by the PSLRA, 
we posit that suits resulting in dismissal or nuisance settlement before the enactment of the law 
will be less likely to be filed post-PSLRA. These higher standards, however, may have screened 
out some of the wheat with the chaff.  Accordingly, we focus our tests on whether the PSLRA’s 
higher standards mean that some suits which resulted in a non-trivial settlement prior to the 
PSLRA will not be filed under the new regime.10
Hypothesis 1A (Nuisance Claims) 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are less likely post-PSLRA to file suits that would have 
resulted in dismissal or a low value settlement pre-PSLRA. 
Hypothesis 1B (Non-Nuisance Claims) 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are less likely post-PSLRA to file suits that would have 
resulted in a high value settlement pre-PSLRA. 
 
 
Hard Evidence 
The impact of the PSLRA in raising the costs for pursuing meritorious actions may not be 
uniform.  Some potential cases will have pre-filing hard evidence of fraud, increasing the 
probability of recovery, in some cases making recovery essentially a foregone conclusion. Hard 
evidence of fraud facilitates the ability of plaintiff attorneys’ to meet the various PSLRA-
imposed requirements, including the heightened pleading requirements at the motion to dismiss 
stage for Rule 10b-5 actions (before any discovery has taken place).  Therefore, hard evidence 
increases the probability of recovery, and holding the stakes available constant, increases the 
expected value of filing suit.   
                                                 
10 All hypotheses are stated in alternative form. 
9  
10
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 69 [2007]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art69
Screening Effect 
To have an objective measure of hard evidence, we define pre-filing hard evidence as a 
public announcement prior to the filing of suit of an accounting restatement (or an inquiry that is 
expected to lead to a restatement) or an SEC investigation or enforcement action.  A key element 
of any securities fraud claim is a material misstatement or omission.  Some of the strongest 
evidence to satisfy this requirement available to plaintiffs’ lawyers is a violation of generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) that results in an earnings restatement.  A restatement is 
not required unless there has been a material misstatement.  Moreover, given the importance that 
investors place on earnings in valuing a company’s stock, a restatement of earnings is likely to 
correlate with large expected damages.   
The existence of an SEC investigation does not establish any element of the plaintiff’s 
claim, but it does suggest a substantial likelihood of fraud.  The SEC has limited resources, but 
many instances of fraudulent conduct it can pursue.  One plausible theory of the SEC’s 
enforcement strategy is that the strength of the available evidence of fraud is one important 
factor (among others) guiding the agency’s enforcement decisions.  The more egregious the 
fraud, the easier the case is to prove.  On this theory, an SEC enforcement action signals to 
plaintiffs’ lawyers a high probability of recovery. 
Conversely, we predict that the PSLRA discourages litigation that would have been 
deemed non-nuisance under pre-PSLRA standards, but lacks pre-filing hard evidence of fraud.  
The absence of an announcement of an accounting restatement or SEC investigation prior to the 
filing of suit does not mean that a suit is without merit.  Misstatements unrelated to financial 
results are equally actionable, and given that the SEC has finite enforcement resources, many 
instances of fraud may escape SEC investigation.  Prior to the PSLRA, the discovery process 
allowed plaintiffs’ attorneys to obtain evidence of the fraud from the defendants to aid in drafting 
10  
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an adequate complaint.  Congress adopted the PSLRA’s discovery stay provision to discourage 
“fishing expedition” discovery, but it may also have discouraged meritorious suits for which 
evidence was not publicly available.  Thus, plaintiffs’ attorneys may also react to the PSLRA 
differentially based on whether there exists hard evidence of fraud prior to the filing of suit. 
Hypothesis 2 (Hard Evidence) 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are less likely post-PSLRA to file suits that would have 
resulted in a high value settlement pre-PSLRA without pre-filing hard evidence of 
fraud. 
 
Insider Trading 
Insider trading contemporaneous with the alleged fraud can be used to show that 
the defendants acted with the requisite scienter to meet the PSLRA’s pleading standard.  
With certain exceptions, insiders must publicly disclose their trades in Form 4 filings 
with the SEC.  In these respects, insider trading provides an alternative to the hard 
evidence provided by SEC investigations and accounting restatements for plaintiffs’ 
lawyers seeking to draft a complaint that will withstand a motion to dismiss. 
Insider trading differs from those types of hard evidence, however, because it 
offers less clear cut support to a claim of fraud.  Insider sales are quite common in many 
industries due to the prevalence of compensation schemes relying heavily on options.  
Pritchard and Sale (2005) show that, relative to other complaints, complaints alleging 
insider trading are more likely to be dismissed, suggesting that plaintiffs’ attorneys have 
been somewhat scattershot with their allegations of insider trading.  The doctrinal 
explanation for the higher dismissal rates related to insider trading based complaints is 
that courts hold that insider trading must be unusual in amount or timing to support an 
inference that the defendant acted with fraudulent intent.  Given the generally high 
incidence of insider trading allegations post-PSLRA, we posit that claims lacking 
11  
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evidence of abnormal selling by insiders are less likely to be filed post-PSLRA, if they 
also lack hard evidence of fraud. 
Hypothesis 3 (Abnormal Insider Trading) 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are less likely post-PSLRA to file suits that would have 
resulted in a high value settlement pre-PSLRA without evidence of abnormal 
insider trading or hard evidence of fraud. 
 
Earnings Warnings 
In enacting the PSLRA, Congress expressed concern that companies failing to meet 
earnings expectations were vulnerable to securities fraud class actions.  A failure to meet 
expectations, with the inevitable drop in the stock price, triggered a search by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys for a prior optimistic statement that could now be alleged to be fraudulent.  Fear of 
liability exposure, it was argued, discouraged firms from making earnings forecasts, despite the 
importance of such disclosures to the pricing of securities.  Congress addressed this concern with 
a forward-looking safe harbor, which makes it more difficult to bring fraud claims based on 
projections.  Consequently, courts subject these statements to more exacting scrutiny than other 
general allegations of misleading statements or omissions.  In effect, Congress raised the 
standard for what counts as “meritorious” for a class of claims that legislators suspected had a 
very low correlation with fraud.  This more stringent definition of merit may have discouraged 
plaintiffs’ claims triggered by the failure to meet earnings expectations.  On the other hand, it 
costs little to include a forward-looking allegation in a complaint that also includes allegations 
based on hard evidence of fraud or abnormal insider trading.  JNP present evidence of only a 
slight decline in forecasting allegations, but they note a sharp drop in the incidence of stand-
alone forecasting allegations, i.e., unaccompanied by an accounting allegation or an insider 
trading allegation. 
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Hypothesis 4 (Earnings Warnings) 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are less likely post-PSLRA to file suits that would have 
resulted in a high value settlement pre-PSLRA based on a failure to meet earnings 
forecasts without evidence of abnormal insider trading or hard evidence of fraud. 
 
 
Outcomes 
The filing of claims by plaintiffs’ attorneys presumably is informed by their expectations 
regarding the outcomes of those cases.  Given the barriers erected by the PSLRA, claims lacking 
hard evidence or evidence of abnormal insider trading may be more likely to be dismissed or 
settled for negligible amounts.  Moreover, suits triggered by earnings warnings lacking hard 
evidence or abnormal insider trading are also more likely to be dismissed or settled on the cheap.    
Hypothesis 5A (Hard Evidence Outcomes) 
Suits lacking hard evidence of fraud that received a non-nuisance outcome pre-
PSLRA are more likely to receive a dismissal or low value settlement post-
PSLRA. 
Hypothesis 5B (Abnormal Insider Trading Outcomes) 
Suits lacking evidence of abnormal insider trading or hard evidence of fraud that 
received a non-nuisance outcome pre-PSLRA are more likely to receive a 
dismissal or low value settlement post-PSLRA. 
Hypothesis 5C (Earnings Warning Outcomes): 
Suits triggered by earning warnings without evidence of abnormal insider trading 
or hard evidence of fraud that received a non-nuisance outcome pre-PSLRA are 
more likely to receive a dismissal or low value settlement post-PSLRA. 
 
 
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA 
Sample 
The first portion of our sample, drawn from JNP, consists of firms in the computer 
hardware (SIC codes 3570-3577) and computer software (SIC codes 7370-7379) industries 
during 1991-2000. The high technology sector has been the most common target for class actions 
both before and after the PSLRA, unlike other sectors where the incidence of litigation has 
13  
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fluctuated over time for reasons unrelated to passage of the PSLRA.11  In order to broaden the 
generalizability of our findings, we include an equal number of firms randomly selected from 
other (non-financial services) industries. 
Data 
We use the Securities Class Action Alert to identify firms sued in securities fraud class 
actions in the pre-PSLRA period (1991-1995), and the Stanford Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse to identify firms sued in the post-PSLRA period (1996-2000).  Data from these 
sources, along with disclosures in firms’ periodic SEC filings, discussions of cases in judicial 
opinions, websites of various claims administrators, and data provided by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, were used to identify the date the lawsuit was filed, the class period,  
and the lawsuit outcome. 
 Market and accounting data were obtained from the CRSP and Compustat tapes.  Data on 
accounting restatements and voluntary management earnings forecasts were obtained from a 
Lexis search of news stories as well as the company’s periodic filings with the SEC.  Insider 
trading data were obtained from Thomson Financial.  Finally, information regarding corporate 
governance structure was obtained from firms’ last proxy statement prior to the beginning of the 
class period, if available; if not, the first available proxy after the beginning of the class period 
was used. 
Descriptive Statistics 
As shown in Table 1, Panel A, our lawsuit sample consists of 219 firms with the requisite 
data, 98 of which were sued pre-PSLRA and 121 post-PSLRA.  As in JNP, the proportion of 
lawsuits alleging accounting fraud and insider trading rises sharply after the PSLRA, while the 
                                                 
11 For example, litigation against finance companies declined significantly in the post-PSLRA period due to the end 
of the savings and loan crisis and an associated reduction in loan loss reserve litigation (Grundfest and Perino 1997). 
14  
15
Choi et al.:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007
Screening Effect 
percentage of suits alleging false forecasts declines, although not as precipitously.  These trends 
are consistent with plaintiffs’ lawyers relying more on objective evidence to support their claims 
of fraud and the forward-looking safe harbor discouraging, to some extent, the filing of 
allegations based on forecasts.   
Table 1, Panel B summarizes the outcomes of these suits.  Mean settlements values are 
nearly double post-PSLRA, although this trend appears to be driven by a few large settlements, 
as the median is essentially unchanged from the pre-PSLRA period.  Another notable difference 
is the increase in suits dismissed, from 20% pre-PSLRA to nearly 32% post-PSLRA. 
To examine factors associated with lawsuit filings, we construct a control sample by 
matching each lawsuit firm with a firm from the same industry that was not sued, but which 
experienced a similar one-day stock price decline during the sued firm’s class period.12  Losses 
suffered by investors are a critical element in determining damages, and thus a stock price 
decline is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for litigation.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys use price 
declines as an initial screen in selecting which firms to sue.  Not all of these firms are sued, 
however, as plaintiffs’ attorneys search for other factors useful in establishing liability, such as 
those discussed in the preceding section, that suggest a lawsuit has sufficient probability of 
recovery. 
In Table 2 we compare the pre- and post-PSLRA samples.  Our variable, Restatement, is 
an indicator equal to one if the firm restated class period earnings.13  This variable is 
significantly higher for the post-PSLRA firms, with 19% restating earnings versus only 7% pre-
PSLRA.  Of greater use to plaintiffs’ attorneys are restatements disclosed prior to lawsuit filing 
(Prefiling Restatement).  Fifteen percent of the post-PSLRA firms had prefiling restatements, 
                                                 
12 For a small number of firms we had difficulty finding matches with all other data items available.  For these firms, 
we extended the search for a match with a similar price drop up to three months after the end of the class period. 
13 All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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relative to only 5% pre-PSLRA.  Taken together, both variables suggest that restatements are 
considerably more prevalent post-PSLRA.   
A smaller percentage of firms were subject to SEC investigations, but again the 
percentage is higher post-PSLRA, 13% relative to 9% (although the difference is not significant 
at conventional levels).  Given the long time frame for many SEC investigations, it is not 
surprising to find that only 1.5% of the sued firms had prefiling SEC investigations pre-PSLRA 
and only 4.5% post-PSLRA.    
We create a third set of indicator variables, Hard Evidence and Prefiling Hard Evidence, 
set to one if the firm had either a restatement or an SEC investigation.  Both versions of this 
indicator variable are significantly greater in the post-PSLRA period.  The PSLRA required that 
plaintiffs plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendants’ had 
the requisite scienter for Rule 10b-5 liability.  Public restatements or announcements of an SEC 
investigation or enforcement action that occurred prior to the filing of a lawsuit (as indicated in 
the Prefiling Hard Evidence variable) provide plaintiffs a “smoking gun” at which to point in 
meeting the heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA and thereby avoid an early 
dismissal.   
Following JNP (2007), we measure our insider trading variable, Abnormal Insider 
Trading, as the difference between the net amount of shares traded (in millions) by directors and 
officers during the class period and the net amount of shares traded by directors and officers 
during an equal number of days preceding the start of the class period.  For example, if the class 
period is 120 days, we subtract the net amount of insider shares traded during the 120 days prior 
to the start of the class period from the net amount of insider shares traded during the class 
period.  A negative (positive) value for these variables indicates net sales (purchases).  We find 
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that Abnormal Insider Trading is more negative in the post-PSLRA period (significant at the .06 
level).   
We utilize three indicator variables to capture firms’ forward-looking disclosures.  First, 
voluntarily warning of bad earnings news can cause a sudden stock price drop that attracts the 
attention of the plaintiffs’ bar (e.g., Francis et al., 1994; Skinner, 1997).  Thus, the variable 
Earnings Warning is equal to one if the firm issued a bad news earnings forecast on either the 
last day of the class period or the day with the most negative stock return during the class 
period.14  Second, firms may attempt to avoid litigation by managing expectations downward.  
Thus, the variable Negative Forecast is equal to one if the firm issues an unfavorable earnings 
projection at any point during the class period other than on the last day or the minimum return 
date.  Finally, forecasting good earnings news leaves the firm vulnerable to litigation if the 
projections are not realized.  Thus, the variable, Positive Forecast, is equal to one if the firm 
issues an optimistic earnings forecast during the class period.  None of these three variables are 
statistically significantly different between the two periods. 
We also consider the role of corporate governance in securities litigation.  Although weak 
governance does not provide direct evidence of fraud, several studies document that weak 
governance is associated with enforcement actions by the SEC (e.g., Beasley 1996; Dechow et 
al. 1996).  Thus, our analysis includes the following governance variables: (i) Avg. Tenure, the 
average number of years outside directors have served on the Board, (ii) Busy, the average 
number of other directorships held by outside directors, (iii) Independent, the percentage of 
outside directors, (iv) Audit Meetings, the number of meetings held by the firm’s audit 
committee, and (v) Independent Audit, the percentage of independent directors on the audit 
                                                 
14 Our definition of the class period includes one trading day following the end of the class period specified in the 
lawsuit.  This is because the revelation of potential fraud that triggers the suit may occur after the market closed, 
resulting in a negative market reaction the following trading day. 
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committee.  Only one of the governance variables, Independent Audit, is significantly different 
between the pre- and post-PSLRA periods, with audit committees more independent after the 
PSLRA. 
Prior research indicates that the market value of equity (MarketCap) and share turnover 
(Turnover) – both factors in the determination of potential damages – are positively associated 
with the incidence of lawsuits (e.g., Francis et al. 1994; Jones and Weingram 1996a; JNP).  The 
results in Table 2 indicate that there is no statistical difference in firm size between the pre- and 
post-PSLRA periods, although share turnover is significantly higher post-PSLRA.  Finally, Table 
2 reports descriptive statistics for the minimum one-day return (Min. Return) during the class 
period.15  The results reveal that Min. Return is significantly more negative in the post-PSLRA 
period. 
Table 3 compares the lawsuit firms with the control sample.  In the pre-PSLRA period 
(Panel A), lawsuits firms are significantly more likely to have a restatement or an SEC 
investigation, but the difference is not significant for either of the prefiling versions of those 
variables.  The same pattern holds for Hard Evidence and Prefiling Hard Evidence.  In the post-
PSLRA period (Panel B), the sued firms once again have more restatements, SEC investigations, 
and Hard Evidence, but the differences are significant both overall and prefiling.  For our 
abnormal insider trading variable, we find no significant differences between the sued firms and 
the control firms in the pre-PSLRA period.  Post-PSLRA, however, sued firm insiders are 
significantly greater net sellers.  For the forecasting variables, we find that sued firms are 
significantly more likely to make positive forecasts and to have had an earnings warning at the 
                                                 
15 For most of the sued firms, the minimum return occurs on the day the bad news giving rise to the lawsuit is 
revealed, which is typically the last day of the class period or the day after. 
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end of the class period.  These relations hold for both periods.  We find no difference between 
the two sub-samples for the Negative Forecast variable. 
Turning to the governance variables, we find no significant differences between the sued 
firms and the control sample pre-PSLRA.  Post-PSLRA, we find significant differences between 
the sued firms and control firms for all of the governance variables except for Avg. Tenure, but 
the difference in three of the four variables are opposite of the predicted direction.  Sued firms 
have more independent boards and more independent audit committees which meet more 
frequently.  The outside board members of the sued firms do, however, sit on more boards than 
their counterparts on the boards of the firms in the control sample.  Overall, these differences 
suggest that our sued firms may have recognized that they were in need of more intensive 
monitoring, but that more intensive monitoring was not sufficient to protect them from suit.  The 
governance variables, however, correlate fairly highly with firm size, so these differences may 
simply reflect plaintiffs’ lawyers preference for suing larger firms.  Finally, our three measures 
relating to damages, Market Cap., Turnover, and Min. Return, are all significantly greater for the 
sued firms, as predicted.  This relation holds for both periods. 
 
V. RESULTS 
Screening of Lawsuit Filings 
Has the PSLRA had the effect of excluding cases that would have been brought under the 
pre-PSLRA regime?  Of course, we would expect to find some cases excluded if the PSLRA is 
working as Congress intended – Congress explicitly intended to discourage “nuisance” litigation.  
If such frivolous litigation existed prior to the PSLRA, a finding that it continued to be brought 
after the enactment of the PSLRA would suggest that the PSLRA was a failure.  Congress 
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claimed, however, that it did not want to discourage “meritorious” litigation in enacting the 
PSLRA.  Screening frivolous litigation without discouraging meritorious litigation would be a 
neat trick, the policy equivalent of a free lunch.  Has Congress provided courts with the tools to 
achieve it in the PSLRA? 
We cannot measure directly the frivolous litigation that the PSLRA discouraged; cases 
not brought leave no paper trail.  We can, however, ask whether the PSLRA has discouraged 
litigation that would have been deemed meritorious pre-PSLRA, as well as litigation that would 
have been deemed frivolous.  This inquiry requires a definition of merit.  For purposes of our 
analysis, we use settlements that are over 0.5% of market capitalization as a proxy for non-
nuisance suits.16   
To test whether non-nuisance suits lacking pre-filing hard evidence were less likely to be 
brought after the enactment of the PSLRA, we examine how non-nuisance suits in the pre-
PSLRA period would have done in the post-PSLRA period using the following methodology: 
 
1. Non-nuisance suits filed in the pre-PSLRA period and their corresponding 
matched firms are identified based on receiving a settlement of at least 0.5% 
of market capitalization (termed the “reference” sample). 
 
2. A logit model for the decision to file suit is estimated solely for the post-
PSLRA period.   
 
3. The estimated logit model is used to generate predicted probabilities of suit in 
the post-PSLRA period for subsamples of firms drawn from the pre-PSLRA 
reference sample.   
 
Table 4 presents the results of the logit model for the post-PSLRA period (step 2 in the 
above methodology).17  Both Prefiling Hard Evidence and Abnormal Insider Trading are 
                                                 
16 This proxy for a non-nuisance suit is from JNP (2007). 
17 Following JNP, we also perform a multinomial logistic regression examining determinants of lawsuit filings. 
Multinomial logit is an extension of the binary logit model to multiple choices.  The procedure estimates the 
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significant determinants of suit post-PSLRA.  Earnings warnings are also an important 
determinant of lawsuits.  Positive Forecast and Negative Forecast, however, are both 
insignificant.  Examining our control variables, none of the coefficients on the governance 
variables are statistically significant, but our three damages variables (Market Cap., Turnover, 
and Min. Return), are all significant.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys may be adjusting to a greater 
likelihood of dismissal (i.e., a lower probability of recovery), by requiring a greater amount of 
potential damages, thereby maintaining the expected value of filing.  Finally, our control variable 
for the high-technology firms from the JNP dataset, Hitech, is insignificant. 
Table 5 reports the results of the third step of our screening methodology, comparing the 
actual fraction of the reference sample sued in the pre-PSLRA period with the fraction that the 
post-PSRLA logit model predicts would be sued. Not surprisingly, Panel A shows a significant 
nuisance suit effect.  The actual fraction of nuisance suits is 50% pre-PSLRA; our prediction 
model suggests that only 41% of these firms would have been sued under the PSLRA regime.  
These suits, of course, are the ones that Congress sought to deter by adopting the PSRLA, so the 
law is to some extent working as intended.  We also find, however, an even more substantial 
screening effect for non-nuisance suits.  Here the actual fraction of sued firms is 51%; our 
prediction model suggests that only 36% of these firms would have been sued under the post-
PSLRA regime.  Thus, the PSLRA is not merely screening claims that would have been deemed 
meritless under the prior rules, but also those with some indicia of merit.  Overall, these results 
support both Hypotheses 1A and 1B. 
                                                                                                                                                             
probability of a particular alternative relative to the probabilities of all other alternatives.  In the analysis of lawsuit 
filings, there are three alternatives:  (i) no lawsuit, (ii) lawsuit in the pre-PSLRA period, and (iii) lawsuit in the post-
PSLRA period.  We perform a similar analysis for the settlement model presented below.  The results for both 
regressions are substantially the same as JNP, so we do not tabulate them here. 
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Which non-nuisance claims are being screened?  Panel B of Table 5 provides evidence 
supporting the hard evidence hypothesis (Hypothesis 2); a significant fraction of non-nuisance 
suits lacking pre-filing hard evidence that plaintiffs’ attorneys brought in the pre-PSLRA period 
would not have been brought in the post-PSLRA period.  Most firms (104) lacked pre-filing hard 
evidence, but nonetheless 48% were sued in the pre-PSLRA period.  Applying the post-PSLRA 
prediction model indicates that only 33% of these firms would have been sued under the PSLRA 
regime.  These results suggest that plaintiffs’ lawyers require more objective evidence of fraud 
before they are willing to file suit under the more demanding standards of the PSLRA. 
Panel C shows that the screening effect persists if we include abnormal insider trading 
along with pre-filing hard evidence.  Of the 88 firms that lacked pre-filing hard evidence and 
abnormal insider trading, our model predicts that only 33% of the firms that paid non-nuisance 
settlements would have been sued under the PSLRA regime.  This difference is significant at the 
1% level.  Notably, we find no significant difference for the firms with either prefiling hard 
evidence or abnormal insider trading.  This evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
The results also support Hypothesis 4 (Plaintiffs’ attorneys are less likely to file suits 
based on a failure to meet earnings forecasts post-PSLRA).  Panel D of Table 5 shows a 
significantly reduced probability of a suit for claims based on an Earnings Warning. Of the 36 
firms in our reference sample that had an earnings warning near the end of the class period, 78% 
were actually sued.  Applying the post-PSLRA prediction model yields a figure of 61%.  The 
difference between the two percentages is significant at the 1% level.  Once again, the screening 
effect is most pronounced for firms lacking pre-filing hard evidence and abnormal insider 
trading.  Of the 23 firms having these characteristics in the reference sample, 87% were actually 
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sued, but under our prediction model the incidence of suit drops to 63%.  The difference between 
these two percentages is also significant at the 1% level.   
It is possible that we have set the definition for “nuisance” settlements too low.    If we 
have underestimated defense and distraction costs, a nuisance settlement would be 
correspondingly higher.  As a robustness check, we used a series of higher cutoffs for nuisance 
value.  The results are presented in Table 6.  We find a lower predicted incidence of litigation 
under the PSLRA for firms lacking prefiling hard evidence and abnormal insider trading up to 
4% of market capitalization.  Thus, the finding that the PSLRA acts as a screen for suits that 
would have been deemed meritorious under the pre-PSLRA regime appears to be robust.18  
Outcomes 
One explanation for the reluctance of plaintiffs’ attorneys to pursue non-nuisance 
litigation absent pre-filing hard evidence post-PSLRA is a possible shift in the expected 
outcomes of suits.  Recall that Table 1 reported a higher likelihood of dismissal for suits filed 
post-PSLRA.  To assess whether the PSLRA has a comparable screening effect on outcomes as 
well as filings, we repeat the screening analysis presented in Table 5, but this time applying the 
post-PSLRA outcome model to predict the likelihood of a non-nuisance outcome for the pre-
PSLRA suits if they were subject to the PSRLA regime.   
                                                 
18 As a further robustness check, we use an alternative definition of non-nuisance, specifically, suits that result in a 
settlement of over $2 million. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 727, 740-41 (1995).  
Grundfest adopts the rule of thumb that settlements for less than a cutoff ranging from $2.5 to $1.5 million are 
nuisance in the sense that “the merits may not have mattered at all in the resolution of the litigation.”  Id. at 742-43.  
Although settlements under $2 million likely include both nuisance and non-nuisance suits (some of which may 
have settled for small amounts because the defendants lacked assets and insurance coverage), settlements over $2 
million are likely to have at least some merit.  To the extent defendants settle nuisance suits to avoid defense 
litigation costs as well as possible distraction on management and negative publicity, the maximum amount 
defendants will settle a nuisance claim typically will not exceed $2 million.  (Settlement amounts have been 
normalized into 2000 dollars.)  The predicted incidence of litigation is significantly lower using a $2 million cutoff, 
and continues to be lower up to a cutoff of $6 million, a relatively generous definition of defense costs.  The results 
from this analysis are substantially similar to our results using the settlement to market capitalization ratio, so we 
have not tabulated them here. 
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For this analysis, we classify a lawsuit as a dismissal if it was resolved in the company’s 
favor.  Thus, dismissals include lawsuits that were dismissed or settled for a small fraction of the 
firm’s market value.  We consider these “nuisance” settlements, defined as a settlement of less 
than 0.5 percent of a firm’s market value ten days before the end of the class period, as 
tantamount to a dismissal.19   
The post-PSLRA logit regression for settlements in Table 7 has a number of differences 
from the filing model above.  Because we are concerned with the likelihood of recovery rather 
than the amount of recovery, we omit the damages-related variables (Market Cap., Turnover, and 
Min. Return) from this model.  We also omit our governance variables as being only secondary 
indicators of potential fraud, as well as the High Tech indicator variable, which also should not 
influence the lawsuit outcome.  In addition, we substitute Hard Evidence for Prefiling Hard 
Evidence.  The Hard Evidence variable is coded one if there is an SEC investigation or 
restatement any time prior to the announcement of the settlement.  Hard Evidence includes not 
only Prefiling Hard Evidence, but also public restatements and announcements of a SEC 
investigation or enforcement action related to the litigation that occurs anytime after the filing of 
suit up to the outcome date of the litigation.  The occurrence of a restatement or SEC 
investigation even after the filing of suit may pressure defendants into a more generous 
settlement.  We also add an indicator variable that may correlate with likelihood of success, High 
Volume Court, which is coded one for suits filed in the Southern District of New York or a 
district court in any of the California districts.20     
                                                 
19 Following JNP, we do not estimate a linear model using the actual settlement amount as the dependent variable 
due to the lack of data on directors & officers insurance coverage (an important determinant of the actual settlement 
amount).  
20 Grundfest and Pritchard (2000) present evidence that courts in these districts with a substantial number of 
securities fraud class actions may be more skeptical of such claims.   
24  
25
Choi et al.:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007
Screening Effect 
We report the results of this regression in Table 7.  We find that Hard Evidence correlates 
significantly with a non-nuisance settlement post-PSRLA.  The screening effect that we found in 
our analysis of filing decisions appears to be a rational response by plaintiffs’ attorneys to a shift 
in the probability of recovery.  Turning to insider trading, the coefficient on Abnormal Insider 
Trading is not significant.  Despite its strong influence on filings post-PSLRA, insider trading 
appears to be only a weak predictor of outcomes.  Our forecasting variables are also 
insignificant, as is High Volume Court.   
The results for the screening methodology presented in Table 8, once again show a 
significant screening effect.  Panel A shows that the actual incidence of non-nuisance outcomes 
is 59% for the pre-PSRLA suits; the predicted incidence under the post-PSRLA outcome model 
for these suits drops to 47%, a difference significant at the 0.01 level.  Also consistent with our 
earlier results, the screening effect is less pronounced for cases with hard evidence (Panel B).  
The effect becomes more pronounced when we add abnormal insider trading.  For suits without 
either type of evidence (Panel C), the predicted incidence of non-nuisance outcome post-PSLRA 
is 39%, as opposed to the 56% of these suits that actually produced a non-nuisance settlement 
pre-PSLRA.  For suits that have hard evidence or abnormal insider trading, however, the actual 
pre-PSLRA figure is 65%, while the predicted post-PSLRA figure is 61%, an insignificant 
difference.  Thus, our outcome screening analysis supports Hypotheses 5A and 5B. 
We also find a significant screening effect for the suits based on earnings warnings (Panel 
D).  In the pre-PSLRA period, 50% of these suits produced non-nuisance outcomes, but our 
prediction model suggests that only 41% would have yielded a non-nuisance outcome in the 
post-PSRLA period.  The screening effect is only slightly more pronounced, however, for the 
earnings warning suits lacking hard evidence and abnormal insider trading.  For these suits, the 
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actual percentage was 49%, but our prediction model percentage is 37%, still a significant 
difference, but not substantially greater than the screening effect for earnings warning suits 
overall. 
To test the robustness of these results, we present the results of alternative definitions of 
high value settlement in Table 9.  We find a significantly lower probability of a high value 
settlement up to 2.5% of market capitalization, a fairly stringent definition of a non-nuisance 
settlement.  We conclude that our finding of a screening effect for case outcomes is reasonably 
robust to alternative specifications of a non-nuisance suit. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Our primary finding supports the existence of a screening effect; many suits that would 
have been deemed non-nuisance prior to the PSLRA likely would not have been filed after 
Congress adopted the PSLRA.  Moreover, the suits, if filed, would be less likely to generate a 
non-nuisance outcome.  We also find, however, that a significantly lower percentage of suits that 
produced a nuisance value settlement or dismissal pre-PSLRA would have been brought post-
PSLRA.  In particular, the PSLRA seems to have a strong screening effect for suits based on 
earnings warnings. 
Our findings suggest, not surprisingly, that there is no free lunch.  Congress’s efforts to 
discourage frivolous litigation may have succeeded, but that success comes at the price of 
discouraging securities fraud class actions which would likely have been deemed meritorious 
prior to the PSLRA.  If such actions had a useful deterrent effect, reducing the incidence of such 
actions came at the price of reduced deterrence.  Our finding of a screening effect cannot tell us 
whether the benefits to companies of reduced exposure to litigation outweigh any diminution in 
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deterrence.  To answer that question would require a measure of the marginal deterrence 
provided by securities fraud class action; finding such a measure is an important task for future 
research into the effect of securities fraud class actions. 
We conclude that Congress effectively elevated the definition of merit in adopting the 
largely procedural requirements of the PSLRA.  Substance and procedure are inextricably 
intertwined.  Assessing whether Congress has set the level of “merit” too high or too low cannot 
be answered within the framework of this study.  It may be that the suits discouraged by the 
adoption of the PSLRA, although sufficient to generate non-nuisance settlements under the then-
prevailing standards, may have added little to the deterrent effect provided by securities fraud 
class actions.  Currently available econometric methods cannot tell us whether this trade-off was 
worth it, but they can help show that the trade-off is real. 
27  
28
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 69 [2007]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art69
 APPENDIX 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Prediction
Restatement Indicator variable equal to one if the firm restated class period 
earnings; zero otherwise 
+ 
   
Prefiling 
Restatement 
Indicator variable equal to one if the firm restated class period 
earnings before the filing of the complaint; zero otherwise 
+ 
   
SEC 
Investigation 
Indicator variable equal to one if the firm was investigated by the 
SEC for conduct during the class period; zero otherwise 
+ 
   
Prefiling SEC 
Investigation 
Indicator variable equal to one if the firm was investigated by the 
SEC for conduct during the class period before the filing of the 
complaint; zero otherwise 
+ 
   
Hard Evidence Indicator variable equal to one if the firm restated class period 
earnings or was investigated by the SEC for conduct during the 
class period; zero otherwise 
+ 
   
Prefiling Hard 
Evidence 
Indicator variable equal to one if the firm restated class period 
earnings or was investigated by the SEC for conduct during the 
class period before the filing of the complaint; zero otherwise 
+ 
   
Abnormal 
Insider Trading 
Shares purchased less shares sold during the class period by 
directors, CEOs, COOs, CFOs, Presidents and Vice-Presidents less 
the same measure for the number of days in the class period 
preceding the class period 
– 
   
Positive 
Forecast 
Indicator variable equal to one if firm made a positive forecast 
during the class period; zero otherwise + 
   
Negative 
Forecast 
Indicator variable equal to one if firm made a negative forecast 
during the class period other than on the minimum return date or 
the end of the class period; zero otherwise 
– 
   
Earnings 
Warning 
Indicator variable equal to one if firm made a negative forecast on 
either the class end or minimum return dates; zero otherwise + 
   
Avg. Tenure Mean number of years that outside directors have been on board – 
   
Busy Mean number of external directorships of public companies held by 
outside directors + 
   
Independent The percentage of outside directors on the firm’s board − 
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Audit Meetings Number of meetings held by the audit committee − 
   
Independent 
Audit 
The percentage of outside directors on the audit committee − 
   
Market Cap. Log of market value of common equity at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding the beginning of the class period + 
   
Turnover 1 – (1 –Turn)X, where Turn is average daily trading volume divided 
by the number of shares outstanding, and X is the number of trading 
days during the class period 
+ 
   
Min. Return Minimum one-day return during the class period plus one day after 
the end of the class period – 
   
HiTech Indicator variable equal to one if the firm is in the SIC codes 3570-
3577 or 7370-7379; zero otherwise + 
   
High Volume 
Court 
Indicator variable equal to one if the lawsuit is in the SDNY, SD 
Cal, ND Cal, CD Cal ; zero otherwise − 
   
 
The governance variables are obtained from the last available proxy statement preceding the 
beginning of the class period, if available; if not, the first available proxy after the beginning of 
the class period was used. 
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Table 1 
 
Panel A: Number of filings and allegations 
 
Lawsuit Filing Year Number of 
Lawsuits 
Accounting 
Allegations 
Insider Trading 
Allegations 
Forecast 
Allegations 
1991 18 6 (35.3%) 4 (25.0%) 12 (70.6%) 
1992 22 7 (36.8%) 5 (26.3%) 15 (79.0%) 
1993 16 6 (42.9%) 3 (21.4%) 12 (85.7%) 
1994 23 7 (30.4%) 9 (39.1%) 17 (73.9%) 
1995 19 6 (31.6%) 5 (26.3%) 13 (68.4%) 
Pre-PSLRA Total 98 32 (34.8%) 26 (28.6%) 69 (75.0%) 
     
1996 12 7 (58.3%) 10 (83.3%) 5 (41.7%) 
1997 25 12 (48.0%) 16 (64.0%) 17 (68.0%) 
1998 32 20 (64.5%) 17 (54.8%) 17 (54.8%) 
1999 29 15 (51.7%) 20 (69.0%) 20 (69.0%) 
2000 23 11 (50.0%) 13 (59.0%) 14 (63.6%) 
Post-PSLRA Total 121 65 (54.6% 76 (63.9%) 73 (61.3%) 
     
Total 219 97 (46.0%) 102 (48.6%) 142 (67.3%) 
 
Panel B: Lawsuit Outcomes 
 
Outcome Pre-PSLRA Post-PSLRA 
Dismissed 21 (21.4%) 37 (30.8%) 
   
Settled (in millions)   
< $2 15 (15.3%) 13 (10.8%) 
$2 - < $5 19 (19.4%) 23 (19.2%) 
$5 - < $10 20 (20.4%) 20 (16.7%) 
> $10 20 (20.4%) 27 (22.5%) 
   
Trial Verdict for Defendants 3 (3.1%) 0 (0.0%) 
Total 98 (100.0%) 120 (100.0%) 
   
   
Amount (in millions):   
Mean 11.26 19.00 
(including dismissals) 8.50 13.14 
Median 5.76 5.59 
(including dismissals) 3.20 3.38 
Maximum 123.08 251.83 
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 Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Comparing Pre- and Post-PSLRA Periods 
 
 
 Pre-PSLRA Post-PSLRA Test of 
Differences 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median 
Restatement 0.071 0.000 0.258 0.178 0.000 0.383 0.001 0.001 
Prefiling Restatement 0.051 0.000 0.221 0.149 0.000 0.357 0.001 0.001 
SEC Investigation 0.087 0.000 0.282 0.103 0.000 0.305 0.559 0.559 
Prefiling SEC Investigation 0.015 0.000 0.123 0.037 0.000 0.190 0.164 0.164 
Hard Evidence 0.123 0.000 0.328 0.198 0.000 0.400 0.033 0.033 
Prefiling Hard Evidence 0.066 0.000 0.250 0.149 0.000 0.357 0.006 0.007 
Abnormal Insider Trading −0.012 0.000 0.259 −0.091 0.000 0.539 0.060 0.027 
Positive Forecast 0.255 0.000 0.437 0.248 .0.000 0.433 0.864 0.864 
Negative Forecast 0.184 0.000 0.388 0.157 0.000 0.365 0.461 0.460 
Earnings Warning 0.347 0.000 0.477 0.372 0.000 0.484 0.590 0.589 
Avg. Tenure 5.486 4.548 4.253 5.064 4.292 3.594 0.261 0.485 
Busy 1.581 1.333 1.391 1.392 1.250 1.107 0.115 0.335 
Independent 0.568 0.580 0.184 0.588 0.600 0.191 0.254 0.192 
Audit Meetings 2.253 2.000 1.698 2.318 2.000 1.937 0.713 0.906 
Independent Audit 0.737 0.800 0.320 0.798 1.000 0.295 0.039 0.027 
Market Cap.(mill.) 2208.1 173.9 8683.2 3566.7 205.0 16050.6 0.287 0.692 
Turnover  0.551 0.527 0.325 0.690 0.794 0.299 0.000 0.000 
Min. Return -0.216 −0.205 0.115 −0.278 −0.267 0.149 0.000 0.000 
Variable definitions are in the Appendix.  The pre-PSLRA period is 1991-1995 and the post-PSLRA period is 1996-1999. 
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Table 3: Comparison of Lawsuit and Control Firms 
 
 
Panel A: Pre-PSLRA Period 
 Lawsuit Firms (N=98) Control Firms (N=98) Test of Differences 
 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median 
Restatement 0.112 0.000 0.317 0.031 0.000 0.173 0.027 0.027 
Prefiling Restatement 0.071 0.000 0.259 0.031 0.000 0.173 0.196 0.195 
SEC Investigation 0.163 0.000 0.372 0.010 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.000 
Prefiling SEC Investigation 0.020 0.000 0.142 0.010 0.000 0.101 0.563 0.562 
Hard Evidence 0.204 0.000 0.405 0.041 0.000 0.199 0.000 0.001 
Prefiling Hard Evidence 0.092 0.000 0.290 0.041 0.000 0.199 0.153 0.152 
Abnormal Insider Trading −0.022 0.000 0.335 −0.001 0.000 0.148 0.585 0.633 
Positive Forecast 0.337 0.000 0.475 0.174 0.000 0.145 0.009 0.009 
Negative Forecast 0.214 0.000 0.412 0.153 0.000 0.362 0.271 0.270 
Earnings Warning 0.571 0.000 0.497 0.123 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.000 
Avg. Tenure 5.070 4.175 3.381 5.902 5.339 4.957 0.172 0.545 
Busy 1.603 1.500 1.149 1.558 1.225 1.602 0.821 0.245 
Independent 0.551 0.517 0.181 0.584 0.600 0.186 0.206 0.198 
Audit Meetings 2.449 2.000 1.568 2.058 2.000 1.806 0.107 0.131 
Independent Audit 0.763 1.000 0.305 0.711 0.708 0.335 0.256 0.242 
Market Cap. (mill.) 3470.6 605.2 11749.6 945.5 71.6 3209.2 0.042 0.000 
Turnover  0.693 0.766 0.282 0.409 0.373 0.303 0.000 0.000 
Min. Return −0.242 −0.235 0.108 −0.189 −0.164 0.116 0.001 0.000 
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Panel B: Post-PSLRA Period 
 Lawsuit Firms (N=121) Control Firms (N=121) Test of Differences 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Median 
Restatement 0.298 0.000 0.459 0.058 0.000 0.234 0.000 0.000 
Prefiling Restatement 0.240 0.000 0.429 0.058 0.000 0.234 0.000 0.000 
SEC Investigation 0.198 0.000 0.400 0.008 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000 
Prefiling SEC Investigation 0.066 0.000 0.250 0.008 0.000 0.091 0.017 0.018 
Hard Evidence 0.339 0.000 0.475 0.058 0.000 0.234 0.000 0.000 
Prefiling Hard Evidence 0.240 0.000 0.429 0.058 0.000 0.234 0.000 0.000 
Abnormal Insider Trading −0.185 −0.023 0.584 0.002 0.000 0.473 0.007 0.000 
Positive Forecast 0.314 0.000 0.466 0.182 0.000 0.387 0.017 0.018 
Negative Forecast 0.190 0.000 0.394 0.124 0.000 0.331 0.159 0.159 
Earnings Warning 0.595 0.000 0.493 0.149 0.000 0.357 0.000 0.000 
Avg. Tenure 4.900 4.400 2.837 5.227 4.000 4.223 0.480 0.637 
Busy 1.615 1.600 1.074 1.169 1.000 1.100 0.002 0.001 
Independent 0.623 0.647 0.184 0.554 0.571 0.192 0.004 0.005 
Audit Meetings 2.645 2.000 1.962 1.992 2.000 1.864 0.009 0.004 
Independent Audit 0.853 1.000 0.246 0.743 1.000 0.329 0.004 0.007 
Market Cap (mill.) 6348.4 544.8 22055.7 785.0 70.0 3916.0 0.007 0.000 
Turnover  0.808 0.924 0.246 0.572 0.573 0.301 0.000 0.000 
Min. Return −0.312 −0.310 -0.310 −0.242 -0.208 0.137 0.000 0.001 
Variable definitions are in the Appendix.  The pre-PSLRA period is 1991-1995 and the post-PSLRA period is 1996-1999.
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Table 4: Factors Associated with Lawsuit Filings in the post-PSLRA period 
 
 Post-PSLRA  
Variable Coeff. p-value 
Prefiling Hard Evidence 2.372 0.000 
Abnormal Insider Trading -1.014 0.015 
Positive Forecast 0.447 0.383 
Negative Forecast -0.315 0.582 
Earnings Warning 1.044 0.021 
Tenure -0.046 0.465 
Busy -0.046 0.820 
Independent -0.922 0.478 
Meetings -0.156 0.244 
Independent Audit 0.737 0.380 
Log (Market Cap.) 0.719 0.000 
Turnover 2.017 0.011 
Min. Ret -4.052 0.009 
Hitech (JNP Dataset) -0.537 0.183 
Constant -6.437 0.000 
   
Pseudo R2 0.444  
N 229  
Variable definitions are in the Appendix.  The results are for a logistic regression estimated solely for the post-
PSLRA period.  Dependent variable is defined as equal to 1 if there was a lawsuit filing and 0 otherwise.  All p-
values are one-tailed. 
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 Table 5: Comparison of Actual Fraction of Suit Filings for Pre-PSLRA Sample Versus Predicted Fraction of 
Suit Filings Based on Post-PSLRA Logit Model of the Filing of Suit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N 
Actual 
Fraction 
Pre-PSLRA 
Predicted 
Fraction 
Post-PSLRA 
 
 
 
p-value 
Panel A     
Nuisance Suits 80 0.500 0.413 0.016 
Non-Nuisance Suits 112 0.509 0.362 0.000 
Panel B     
Non-Nuisance – No Prefiling Hard Evidence 104 0.480 0.334 0.000 
Non-Nuisance – Prefiling Hard Evidence 8 0.875 0.734 0.157 
Panel C     
Non-Nuisance – No Prefiling Hard Evidence 
and No Abnormal Insider Trading 88 0.500 0.327 0.000 
Non-Nuisance – Prefiling Hard Evidence or 
Abnormal Insider Trading 24 0.542 0.493 0.234 
Panel D     
Non-Nuisance – Earnings Warning  36 0.778 0.611 0.006 
Non-Nuisance – Earnings Warning and No 
Prefiling Hard Evidence and No Abnormal 
Insider Trading 23 0.870 0.632 0.005 
  
Predicted fraction of lawsuit filings is based on a logistic regression model as reported in Table 4.  A non-nuisance outcome is 
defined as having a settlement amount/market cap. ratio over 0.005.   p-value is for a one-tailed t-test of the difference between 
pre-PSLRA actual and pre-PSLRA predicted mean values. 
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 Table 6: Comparison of Actual Fraction of Suits for Pre-PSLRA Sample Versus Predicted Suits Based on 
Post-PSLRA Logit Model of the Filing of Suit for Varying Cut-Off Values for the Settlement Amount/Market 
Cap Ratio [No Prefiling Hard Evidence and No Abnormal Insider Trading]. 
 
 
Settlement 
Amt/Market Cap 
 
 
N 
 
Actual Fraction 
Pre-PSLRA 
Predicted Fraction 
Post-PSLRA 
 
 
p-value 
>=0.005 88 0.500 0.327 0.000 
>=0.01 80 0.475 0.294 0.000 
>=0.015 61 0.508 0.286 0.000 
>=0.02 45 0.533 0.291 0.000 
>=0.025 42 0.548 0.306 0.000 
>=0.03 35 0.543 0.290 0.000 
>=0.035 27 0.556 0.258 0.000 
>=0.04 23 0.565 0.243 0.001 
The Actual and Predicted fraction of suits is determined in the following steps.  (1) The pool of Pre-PSLRA suit 
firms that satisfy the specified settlement amount/market cap. ratio are selected along with their corresponding 
matching firms.  (2) Only those suit and match firms in the pool that have no Prefiling Hard Evidence and no 
Abnormal Insider Trading are identified.  (3) The Actual fraction of Pre-PSLRA suits is equal to the fraction of 
firms that faced a suit in the sample derived from step (2).  (4) The Predicted fraction of Post-PSLRA suits is equal 
to the mean probability of suit for the sample derived from step (2) applying the logistic regression model from 
Table 4.  All p-values are one-tailed. 
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 Table 7: Post-PSLRA Model of Factors Associated with Dismissed versus Settled Lawsuits 
 
 
 Post-PSLRA  
Variable Coeff. p-value 
Hard Evidence 0.882 0.002 
Abnormal Insider Trading 0.287 0.152 
Positive Forecast 0.507 0.064 
Negative Forecast -0.185 0.546 
Earnings Warning -0.302 0.224 
High Volume Court  0.372 0.155 
Constant 0.103 0.803 
   
Log Likelihood -199.873  
Wald χ2 15.30  
N 230  
   Censored N 114  
   Uncensored N 116  
 Variable definitions are in the Appendix.  The reported results are for Stage 2 of a two-stage Heckman model 
(estimated using Stata’s HECKPROB procedure) estimated solely for the post-PSLRA period.  Stage 1 (unreported) 
is a probit model for the decision to file suit in the post-PSLRA period as follows: 
Prob(suit) = f(turnover, abnormal min. ret., hitech, tenure, busy, independent, meetings, independent audit) 
Stage 2 is a probit model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 for where the settlement amount/market cap. 
ratio is over 0.005: 
Prob(non-nuisance outcome) = f(hard evidence, abnormal insider trading, positive forecast, negative forecast, 
earnings warning, high volume court) 
The pre-PSLRA period is 1991-1995 and the post-PSLRA period is 1996-2000. 
 
 
39  
40
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 69 [2007]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art69
 Table 8 
 
Actual and Predicted Non-Nuisance Fraction for Pre-PSLRA Suits (Predictions Based on Model Estimated 
for Suits Filed in the Post-PSLRA Period Only) 
  
 
 N Actual pre-
PSLRA fraction 
of non-nuisance 
outcomes 
Predicted post-
PSLRA fraction 
of non-nuisance 
outcomes 
p-value 
Panel A     
Pre-PSLRA Suits 97 0.588 0.469 0.007 
Panel B     
Pre-PSLRA Suits – No Hard Evidence  78 0.513 0.397 0.020 
Pre-PSLRA Suits – Hard Evidence   19 0.895 0.765 0.054 
Panel C     
Pre-PSLRA Suits – No Abnormal Insider Trading  81 0.630 0.475 0.002 
Pre-PSLRA Suits – Abnormal Insider Trading 16 0.375 0.441 0.714 
Panel D     
Pre-PSLRA Suits – No Hard Evidence and No 
Abnormal Insider Trading 63 0.556 0.394 0.005 
Pre-PSLRA Suits – Hard Evidence or Abnormal 
Insider Trading 34 0.647 0.609 0.292 
Panel E     
Pre-PSLRA Suits – Earnings Warning 56 0.500 0.414 0.090 
Pre-PSLRA Suits – Earnings Warning and No 
Hard Evidence and No Abnormal Insider Trading 35 0.488 0.368 0.085 
Predicted fraction of non-nuisance outcomes is based on a Heckman two-stage model (estimated with the Stata HECKPROB 
procedure).  Stage 1 is a probit model for the decision to file suit in the post-PSLRA period as follows: 
Prob(suit) = f(turnover, abnormal min. ret., hitech, tenure, busy, independent, meetings, independent audit) 
Stage 2 is a probit model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 for where the settlement amount/market cap. ratio is over the 
specified cutoff given in the Table as follows: 
Prob(non-nuisance outcome) = f(hard evidence, abnormal insider trading, positive forecast, negative forecast, earnings 
warning, high volume court) 
The Predicted Fraction of high value outcomes in the post-PSLRA period is conditional on the firm facing a class action lawsuit 
and is equal to the mean of Prob(Outcome above the Dollar Cutoff = yes & Suit Filed = yes) / Prob(Suit Filed = yes).  Non-
nuisance outcomes are defined to include suits that result in a settlement/market capitalization ratio at least 0.005.  p-value is for 
a one-tailed t-test of the difference between pre-PSLRA actual and pre-PSLRA predicted mean values. 
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 Table 9:  Robustness Tests on the Actual and Predicted Fraction Pre-PSLRA Suits Without Hard Evidence of 
Fraud or Abnormal Insider Trading that Receive a High-Value Settlement 
 
 
Settlement 
Amt/Market Cap 
 
 
N 
 
Actual pre-PSLRA 
fraction of outcomes 
above the Cutoff 
Predicted post-
PSLRA fraction of 
outcomes above the 
Cutoff 
 
 
p-value 
>=0.005 63 0.556 0.394 0.005 
     
>=0.01 63 0.460 0.261 0.001 
>=0.015 63 0.365 0.204 0.007 
>=0.02 63 0.270 0.192 0.096 
>=0.025 63 0.254 0.155 0.042 
>=0.03 63 0.190 0.142 0.176 
>=0.035 63 0.127 0.143 0.638 
>=0.04 63 0.111 0.097 0.367 
The predicted fraction of high value outcomes is based on a Heckman two-stage model (estimated with the Stata HECKPROB 
procedure).  Stage 1 is a probit model for the decision to file suit in the post-PSLRA period as follows: 
Prob(suit) = f(turnover, abnormal min. ret., hitech, tenure, busy, independent, meetings, independent audit) 
Stage 2 is a probit model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 for where the settlement amount/market cap. ratio is over the 
specified cutoff given in the Table as follows: 
Prob(Settlement Amount/Market Cap > Cutoff) = f(hard evid, abnormal insider trading, positive forecast, negative 
forecast, earnings warning, high volume court) 
The Predicted Fraction of high value outcomes in the post-PSLRA period is conditional on the firm facing a class action lawsuit 
and is equal to the mean of Prob(Outcome above the Dollar Cutoff = yes & Suit Filed = yes) / Prob(Suit Filed = yes).  p-value is 
for a one-tailed t-test of the difference between pre-PSLRA actual and pre-PSLRA predicted mean values. 
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